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Introduction
In response to the increased financial instability in many countries in the 1990s, policy makers
have become interested in better understanding the vulnerabilities in financial systems and
measures that could help prevent financial crises. One of the key techniques for quantifying
financial sector vulnerabilities is stress testing.
The purpose of this note is to review the literature on the quantitative methods used to assess the
vulnerabilities of financial systems to risks, focusing on the role of system-wide stress testing.
The note summarizes the recent developments in the literature, focusing on topics that could be
interesting in the Czech case. The first section introduces macroprudential analysis, which
encompasses stress testing as one of the main methods. The second section discusses the concept
of a stress test. The third section gives an overview of the stress tests performed by central banks
and international financial institutions. The fourth section describes the implementation of stress
tests as a multi-step process. Finally, the fifth section discusses specific issues relating to
individual shock factors.
To keep the presentation concise, the text focuses on issues that could be of more interest in the
Czech context. Where a topic is well covered elsewhere and the relevant literature is easily
available, only a short summary and a reference to the original source is included. An extensive
list of references is provided in Appendix I. A follow-up technical note describes practical issues
involved in implementing stress tests for the Czech banking system which could be conducted on
a regular basis (Čihák, 2004).
1. Macroprudential Analysis
The assessment and monitoring of the strengths and vulnerabilities of financial systems is called
macroprudential analysis.
1 Macroprudential analysis uses quantitative information on the
financial system as well as qualitative information on the institutional and regulatory framework
(Figure 1). It encompasses surveillance of financial market conditions and analysis of macro-
financial linkages. It is, in turn, part of a broader framework for macroeconomic vulnerability
assessment, which includes the balance sheet approach, debt sustainability analysis, and
monitoring of macroeconomic conditions. One of the key elements of the quantitative analysis is
stress tests.
Measuring financial system soundness requires good quantitative inputs: information on the
structure of the system, general macroeconomic indicators, and “financial soundness indicators”
(FSIs). FSIs are compiled to monitor the soundness of financial institutions and markets, and of
their corporate and household counterparts. Financial market data and macroeconomic data are
useful because they provide forward-looking information that can help in assessing the likelihood
of shocks affecting the financial system.
                                                          
1 For more on macroprudential analysis, see in particular Evans et al. (2000), Sundararajan et al. (2002),
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Figure 1: Framework for Macroprudential Analysis
Source: Sundararajan et al. (2002).
FSIs include both aggregated information on financial institutions and indicators that are
representative of markets in which financial institutions operate. To facilitate the compilation of
these indicators, the IMF has defined sets of “core” and “encouraged” FSIs. A list of the core FSIs
is presented in Table 1. All core FSIs relate to the banking sector, reflecting its dominance in most
countries’ financial systems. The encouraged FSIs include additional indicators for banks, data on
financial market liquidity, nonbank financial institutions, the non-financial corporate sector (e.g.
total debt to equity), the household sector (e.g. household debt service and principal payments to
income), and real estate markets (IMF, 2003a).
 There are three categories of FSIs, each with a
different role: monitoring financial sector vulnerabilities arising from credit, liquidity, and market
risk; assessing the condition of non-financial sectors; and assessing the capacity of the financial
sector to absorb losses, as measured by capital adequacy. For guidance on the definitions and
compilation of the FSIs, see the IMF’s Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide (IMF,
2003a). For the key issues involved with analyzing FSIs, their inter-relationships and their
relationships to other parts of the macroprudential analysis framework, such as stress testing, see
IMF (2003b). Appendix II provides more details on the framework for financial stability analysis,
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Table 1: Financial Soundness Indicators: Core Set
Capital adequacy Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets
Asset quality Nonperforming loans to total gross loans
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans
Large exposures to capital
Earnings and profitability Return on assets
Return on equity
Interest margin to gross income
Noninterest expenses to gross income
Liquidity Liquid assets to total assets (liquid asset ratio)
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities
Sensitivity to market risk Duration of assets
Duration of liabilities
Net open position in foreign exchange to capital
Source: IMF (2003a).
2. The Concept of Stress Testing
In the context of macroprudential analysis, the term stress testing refers to a range of statistical
techniques used to help assess the vulnerability of a financial system to exceptional but plausible
events.
2 For a good general introduction to the stress testing methodology, see Blaschke et al.
(2001). A detailed list of literature references is included in Appendix I.
This note focuses on system-wide stress tests (or macrofinancial stress tests), which measure the
impact of shocks on financial system stability. Compared to stress tests for individual financial
institutions, the system-wide stress tests have—as the name suggests—wider coverage (i.e. the
financial system or a systemically important part of it), are used for a different purpose (financial
sector surveillance rather than risk management), focus more on channels of contagion (i.e. how a
risk to one institution can become a systemic risk), and often have to use more streamlined
techniques (because of the ensuing complexity of the calculations). Also, system-wide stress
testing is a much newer concept, and the literature on the topic is consequently much shorter than
that on stress testing for individual institutions.
3
The system-wide nature of the stress tests does not mean that they should be performed on
aggregate data. Applying the tests to the financial system as a whole or to large groups of
institutions can disguise substantial exposures at the level of individual institutions, which can
lead to failures of these institutions and then contagion to the rest of the system. These exposures
can get “netted out” in the aggregation. It is therefore important to perform the stress tests on an
institution-by-institution basis to the extent possible, and to analyze not only the aggregate results,
                                                          
2 A web search shows about 175,000 occurrences of the term, more than, for instance, “banking supervision”
(72,000) and “capital adequacy” (98,000). This is partly explained by the fact that stress tests are used in areas as
diverse as cardiology, engineering, and software programming.
3 For an introduction to the literature on stress testing for individual institutions, see, for instance, Laubsch
(2000). For an international survey of stress testing practices in major banks, see, for instance, Committee on the
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but also the dispersion of the results around the aggregate figure. The positive “by-product” of
calculating the stress tests this way is that they can be used by bank supervisors as an additional
off-site tool to identify vulnerable banks.
The key element of the definition of stress testing—and also one of the more controversial themes
in the literature on the topic—is the definition of an exceptional but plausible event. While some
authors view stress testing as a subgroup of risk modeling focusing on “tail” events that can and
should be included in a comprehensive risk model (e.g. Berkowitz, 1999), others describe the
selection of scenarios for the system-wide stress tests as “an art” rather than a science (e.g.
Kupiec, 2001). The approach taken in the present paper is an intermediate one: while recognizing
the difficulties involved in estimating an “exact” risk model, especially for multi-factor scenarios
for a system as a whole, the selection of stress test scenarios should be—to the extent possible—
based on a measure of plausibility.
Stress tests can be classified, by methodology, into three main types: (i) sensitivity analysis, which
seeks to identify how portfolios respond to changes in relevant economic variables (such as
interest rates and exchange rates); (ii) scenario analysis, which seeks to assess the resilience of
financial institutions and the financial system to an exceptional but plausible scenario; and (iii)
contagion analysis, which seeks to take account of the transmission of shocks from individual
exposures to the financial system as a whole.
The importance of stress testing for macroprudential analysis derives from integrating a forward-
looking macroeconomic perspective, a focus on the financial system as a whole, and a uniform
approach to the assessment of risk exposures across banks. Unlike the stress tests conducted at
large banks, which are designed to measure portfolio- and bank-specific risk exposures, system-
wide stress tests apply a common set of scenarios based on an assessment of macroeconomic and
market risks. This uniform approach allows for the aggregation of results, helping to identify key
vulnerabilities at the level of the overall system, and providing comparable information on risk
profiles across banks.
Stress testing is primarily about identifying latent  exposures. There is little need to perform
complicated stress test calculations if the exposures are obvious, or obviously lacking. Stress tests
are needed to identify exposures that are less obvious, perhaps hidden across a wide variety of
instruments, credits, and derivatives positions.
2.1 Stress Tests and Analysis of FSIs
In analyses of financial sector stability, FSIs are often used together with stress testing. There are
a number of important differences between stress testing and FSIs, deriving from their different
roles in macroprudential analysis. In particular, stress testing illustrates more clearly the potential
cost of shocks. To serve this purpose, each stress testing exercise must be tailored to the features
of a particular system. This higher flexibility means that is impossible to derive “standard”
methodology comparable to that for compiling FSIs (IMF, 2003a). Stress test shocks and models
are based on judgments and assumptions, so the stress test output is not comparable to FSIs
measuring actual conditions in a financial system. It is not subject to the rigorous standards
applied by statisticians to data.6   Martin Čihák
Bearing in mind these caveats, stress testing and FSIs provide complementary approaches to
analyzing similar risks. The complementarity between stress testing and FSIs is probably of
greatest relevance in the area of sensitivity to market risk. The more advanced state of market risk
stress testing makes it feasible to use the measure of loss from these stress tests as a soundness
indicator along with market risk FSIs. This is more likely to be the case in more sophisticated
financial systems where banks conduct frequent market risk stress tests as an integral part of their
risk management. The results of these stress tests could be presented in a form comparable to the
relevant market risk FSI (e.g. as a measure of loss relative to capital for a shock of a given size).
This complementarity reflects the close relationship between the two at the analytic level. For
example, the estimated direct loss from a stress test of an exchange rate shock can be
approximated by the change in the exchange rate multiplied by the net open foreign exchange
position FSI (see IMF, 2003b).
2.2 Stress Tests and Value-at-Risk Models
Many commercial banks use value-at-risk (VaR) models to measure their risk exposures, in
particular for market risks. While the market risk VaR results may be of interest, their usefulness
for the systemic stress test calculations is limited, since they apply only to trading book assets,
and focus exclusively on losses. As a general matter, VaR and stress test exposure estimates are
not additive. A stress test measures the x percent tail in an assets profit and loss distribution, while
a value-at-risk measures the mark-to-market gain or loss that an asset would experience should
one or more of the underlying economic factors that determine the asset’s value experience a
specific change in value.
Systemic stress test measures must be capable of estimating gains as well as losses in the various
institutions in the financial sector if the intended purpose of the test is to assess the financial
sector’s net exposure to a potential macroeconomic risk. Risk exposures pose the greatest
systemic threat when all or most institutions have exposures of the same sign.
4 Value-at-risk
measures focus on the loss side. The use of a value-at-risk measure in the stress test setting
precludes the ability to measure the net exposures in a system, and so they are an inappropriate
measure of risk in many stress testing situations (Kupiec, 1998 and 2001).
3. Stress Tests by International Financial Institutions and Central Banks
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) have initiated the Financial
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), which strives to assess strengths and vulnerabilities in their
member countries’ financial systems. The assessments under this program have so far covered
more than 50 jurisdictions and provided various recommendations for improvement in the
                                                          
4 This is particularly important for exposures generated by derivative positions. Derivatives instruments are “zero
net supply” contracts, i.e. there is an agent taking a short position for every agent taking a long position. On
many instruments (options being an exception), the potential gains/losses on long/short positions are symmetric.
If derivative losses accrue entirely as gains to counterparties in the same financial system then, on balance, the
financial system has no change in wealth. If these losses accrue entirely as gains to counterparties outside the
system, the financial system has lost wealth. For an open financial system such as the Czech one, it is quite
likely that the aggregate change in wealth will be non-zero. From a macroprudential perspective, the key issue
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financial system framework (many of the assessments are available on the IMF and WB
websites). Stress testing was from the beginning a key element of the assessment of financial
sector stability.
Stress testing in the FSAP has evolved. Most FSAP missions to date have included single-factor
sensitivity analysis based on historical extreme values, although an increasing number have also
applied scenario analyses, using multiple techniques to determine the size of shocks. While almost
all stress tests relied on data provided by the authorities, the involvement of the authorities in the
recent FSAP missions has gone beyond providing data, as they have also been actively involved
in designing and implementing stress tests in the recent FSAP missions. Moreover, recent FSAP
missions to industrialized countries have aimed to improve the effectiveness of stress tests
through the use of macroeconomic models, the analysis of contagion resulting from interbank
exposures, and the involvement of major financial institutions in the stress testing exercise (IMF
and the World Bank, 2003).
The availability and quality of data impose major constraints on the nature of the stress tests that
can be performed. Data limitations have come in three forms: (i) basic data availability, especially
in countries where information on key exposures may not be available; (ii) an inability to isolate
the desired exposures in a financial institution, especially in the case of complex financial
institutions or institutions which are active in the derivative markets; and (iii) confidentiality
issues—limitations on what the authorities are legally able to share with the mission.
The experience of the FSAP to date suggests that the types of stress tests need to be tailored to
country-specific circumstances, the complexity of the financial system, and data availability. In
industrialized countries, the analysis can be strengthened by using macroeconomic models (to
help calibrate the scenarios and arrive at a consistent set of assumptions for the tests), the analysis
of interbank contagion, and the involvement of major banks in the stress testing exercise (IMF and
World Bank, 2003).
The experience also suggests that stress tests can have a number of benefits. In particular, they can
help define the amount and nature of the data required for ongoing monitoring of financial
stability, thereby playing an important role of “capacity building.” They can also provide an
independent verification of potential sources of vulnerability and broaden the understanding of
linkages in the financial system (IMF and World Bank, 2003). Several central banks have started
conducting a regular stress testing exercise following the FSAP, some central banks have
increased regulatory attention to stress tests done by commercial banks, and some central banks
have asked for follow-up technical assistance with establishing a framework for conducting stress
tests on a regular basis.
There are two general uses of stress tests at central banks. The first one is supervisory stress tests
designed to identify potentially weak banks. Stress testing can be used, together with the more
traditional off-site analytical tools (CAEL ratings, early warning systems, and other data and
qualitative information), to help identify banks that are in need of closer supervisory attention and
possibly remedial action. The second use for stress tests is macrofinancial surveillance, i.e.
analysis of the robustness of the financial system as a whole to external shocks. A number of
central banks have started to regularly publish their analyses of financial sector stability (typically
called Financial Stability Reports). The approaches to stress tests used by central banks differ8   Martin Čihák
widely from more mechanical approaches to approaches focusing more on sources of credit risk,
as illustrated by the Financial Stability Reports of the Austrian National Bank, the National Bank
of Hungary, and the Bank of Norway (see Boss, 2002, National Bank of Hungary, 2003, and
Eklund et al., 2001, respectively).
4. Implementing Stress Tests
System-wide stress testing can be viewed as a multi-step process of examining the key
vulnerabilities in the system. This involves: identifying the major risks and exposures in the
system and formulating questions about those risks and exposures; defining the coverage and
identifying the data required and available; calibrating the scenarios or shocks to be applied to the
data; selecting and implementing the methodology; and interpreting the results.
4.1 Identifying Major Risks
To be relevant, stress tests must probe the consequences of potential shocks that are related to the
macroeconomic risks that exist in the actual situation of the country. The process of designing
system-wide stress tests therefore typically starts with a discussion of the potential risks faced by
the economy. The discussion then suggests that certain types of shocks (e.g. a potential increase in
interest rates or a depreciation of the currency) are more likely in the given economy than other
types of shocks.
The fact that there are macroeconomic risks that could result in shocks to the financial system
does not necessarily mean that the impact of the shocks would be large. The impact can still be
small if the exposures in the system are small. It is the purpose of the stress tests to assess how the
risks combine with the exposures. The design of stress tests is often an iterative process, since
some originally identified risks may lead to relatively small impacts, while some risks originally
assessed as small may lead to large impacts if there are substantial exposures.
Even if the exposures are large and stress tests identify a potentially large impact on the financial
system, it is the purpose of the other parts of the macroprudential analysis to assess the likelihood
that these impacts can be mitigated by prompt action by supervisors and banks.
4.2 Defining Coverage and Identifying Data
Another key step in designing stress tests is defining their coverage. The general rule is to include
all systemically relevant institutions and exposures. The practical issues are: what types of
financial institutions to include (typically banks, since they dominate most financial systems, but
sometimes also other institutions, such as insurance companies) and how to include foreign-
owned financial institutions (a typical solution is to include subsidiaries but exclude branches of
foreign-owned financial institutions). In terms of exposures, the most frequently covered are
exposures to credit risk and market risks, and sometimes also liquidity risk and interbank
contagion risk. The choice of coverage then determines the data needed for the calculation.Stress Testing: A Review of key Concepts   9
4.3 Calibrating Shocks and Scenarios
There are two general ways of asking questions about the size of exposures in the financial
system. These two ways correspond to two different approaches to formulating and presenting
stress testing calculations. The first, more typical, way is to formulate an extreme scenario that has
a chosen degree of plausibility and ask what would be its impact on the system. We will call this
method the “worst case approach,” since in effect it looks the scenarios that have the maximum
impact for a given level of plausibility. The second, less common, way is to select a threshold in
terms of the impact on the system and ask what are the smallest shocks that would need to occur
for the system to reach that threshold. We will illustrate that these two approaches are essentially
equivalent, even though they offer two different ways of presenting the vulnerabilities in the
system.
The “worst case” approach
The process of scenario selection under this approach can be summarized as identification of a
“worst case scenario.” Roughly speaking, the worst case scenario for a given portfolio is the
scenario of risk factors that minimizes the value of this portfolio, but has a certain predefined
“plausibility”. This approach only requires the selection of the minimum level of plausibility (e.g.
1 percent) admissible in the worst case scenario. Figure 2 illustrates the choice of the scenario in a
case with two risk factors. These could be thought of as, for instance, the exchange rate and
interest rate. Each of the ellipses depicts the set of combinations of the two risk factors with the
same probability of occurrence. The shape of the ellipse reflects the correlation between the two
factors, and its size the level of plausibility. The larger the ellipse, the smaller the plausibility. The
diagonal lines depict combinations of the risk factors leading to the same overall impact in terms
of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). The impact generally increases with the size of the shocks to
the risk factors, so the CAR decreases in the northeast direction. The diagonal line does not have
to be straight; it is only depicted here as such for simplicity.
The worst case approach would start with selecting a level of plausibility, e.g. 1 percent, and
searching for the combination of shocks with this level of plausibility that have the worst impact
on the portfolio. In Figure 2 this means searching for the point on the largest ellipse (including all
1 percent plausibility events) that lies as far northeast as possible. This is point A.
The “threshold” approach
An alternative approach to presenting stress tests is to present the largest shocks that leave the
system above a certain threshold. For instance, one can ask what is the largest increase in
nonperforming loans (NPLs) that the banking sector would be able to survive with no bank
becoming insolvent. An example of a tighter threshold would be that no bank’s capital adequacy
ratio declines below the Basel Accord minimum of 8 percent. An example of a loose threshold
would be that not more than 25 percent of the banking system becomes insolvent. The advantage
of this approach is that it does not require calibrating macroeconomic scenarios. Also, it provides
a result that is very intuitive and straightforward to interpret. Its potential disadvantage is that it is
more difficult to implement for more than one risk factor. Figure 2 shows how it could be
implemented for two factors.10   Martin Čihák
The threshold approach starts with selecting the threshold, i.e. the diagonal line; it then searches
for the smallest shocks reaching this threshold. This is straightforward if there is only one risk
factor; if there are two risk factors, one needs to take into account the correlation between the risk
factors. For the specific correlation pattern in Figure 2, selecting a threshold of zero capital
adequacy would lead us again to the combination of shocks corresponding to point A. The point
of Figure 2 is to illustrate that even though in particular cases the two approaches can lead to
different results depending on the choice of threshold or plausibility level, these are essentially
equivalent approaches to the same problem.
5
Figure 2: Worst Case Approach vs. Threshold Approach
Source: Author.
Practical approaches
In practice, establishing the exact level of plausibility of a shock or a scenario can be very
difficult. Having in mind that stress testing deals with “tail events,” establishing the probability of
an extreme event can be problematic even for a single factor and single exposure. It is even more
complicated when multiple risk factors are considered (in which case the covariance pattern
comes into question). Finally, it is even more difficult to implement when there is need to map
shocks from macroeconomic variables (such as GDP) into the risk factors directly influencing
banks (such as interest rates). Given the difficulties involved, it is not surprising that some authors
consider stress testing to be “an art” (Kupiec, 2001).
For risk factors where good historical data are available (which is more likely to be the case for
market risks), the natural starting point is to base the scenarios on the patterns of volatility and
covariance observed in past data. Calibrating the shocks is particularly straightforward for single-
factor stress tests for market risks: an exchange rate shock can be based on 3 standard deviations
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of past changes in the exchange rate (corresponding roughly to a 1 percent confidence level). To
establish correlation patterns in models with more risk factors, one could simply look at the
covariance statistics of the various variables, or use stochastic simulations based on existing
macroeconomic models. Such calculations are of course subject to a number of caveats mentioned
earlier (models tend to break down for large shocks). Nonetheless, the models, if used cautiously,
could help in finding a first-cut approximation of the scenarios for the stress-tests.
A practical approach to addressing the difficulties involved in scenario selection is to base the
stress tests on an extreme historical scenario. This approach makes it possible to specify relatively
complex stress tests with a number of risk factors. For Asian countries, for example, such a
scenario might be the 1997 crisis; for the Czech Republic, it might be the 1997 exchange rate
turbulence and the 1997–1999 recession.
6 The advantage of this approach is that it is quite
illustrative and plausible. Its disadvantage is that the plausibility level of such a scenario may not
be clear; at the same time, it is not clear whether the past crisis is a useful model for possible
future crises.
There has been some controversy in the literature about whether stress tests should or should not
include hypothetical scenarios that go beyond the historical experience (Berkowitz, 1999). At the
same time, virtually all authors seem to agree that there can be plausible scenarios that have not
yet happened. Examples of extreme market movements or crises confirm that it is inadequate to
supervise and manage risks only on the basis of business conditions prevailing in the past. New
crises may include, for example, new concentrations of risk emerging through cross-market
linkages not present in the past.
Specifying a hypothetical scenario means simulating shocks that (i) are suspected to be more
likely to occur than historical observation suggests (or that have never occurred); or (ii) reflect a
structural break that could occur in the future (Berkowitz, 1999). Simulating such shocks is
consistent with the general approach to stress testing presented in Figure 2, i.e. the design of the
scenarios is still based on some (at least implicit) probability measure. However, in hypothetical
scenarios, the probability distribution used for scenario selection is different from the one that we
could obtain from past observations.
The easiest case in this context is if the hypothetical scenarios indicate that the exposures are
small. In this case, the “threshold” approach is a useful presentation tool: for example, if we ask
what shocks are needed to make a significant impact on the financial system and find that the
shocks would have to be several times larger than the largest shocks observed so far, the stress
testing scenario provides an important conclusion, namely that the financial system is not very
exposed to the risks considered in the scenario. In this case, the extremely low plausibility of the
stress testing scenario is actually an advantage, because it helps to make the case that the system is
very robust.
One practical possibility for presenting hypothetical scenarios is to combine a scenario justified
by historical data (e.g. a large crisis that happened in the past) with sensitivity analysis (i.e.
alternative assumptions about the sizes of the individual shocks). This approach is still open to the
criticism that the level of plausibility of these scenarios may not be clear, but it at least provides
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some anchor to the shocks (i.e. the main scenario, based on historical experience), while providing
some assessment of the robustness of the scenario’s results with respect to changes in the model
assumptions.
4.4 Selecting and Implementing Methodology
7
The methodologies for individual shocks are discussed in more detail in Section V. As a general
point, when attempting to identify measurement techniques, it is important to understand where
exposures may generate losses in the financial system. This requires estimating where these
exposures are recorded as positions either on or off the balance sheets of the institutions. In
particular in more developed financial systems, finding the exposures may require understanding
the details of the risk transfers that have occurred through derivatives and securitization activities.
Isolating the exposures that generate stress loss estimates often requires that institutions “slice and
dice” their on- and off-balance sheet positions into sector specific decompositions that they may
not typically monitor. Exposure estimates that relate to shocks to a specific economic sector may
be obtained by aggregating the exposures from a customized decomposition of a financial
institution’s alternative activities (e.g. credit, equities, derivatives, credit derivatives, structured
products, strategic long-term investments, and insurance). For example, the correction in the
output of an important economic sector of the economy may be reflected in the stress test by
direct loan and bond related losses on credits extended to this industry, by an equity market price
shock to investments in firms in this industry, by a rise in consumer credit and mortgage related
losses to the extent that wages and employment are adversely affected by the shock, and by losses
on the banking and insurance industries’ off-balance sheet positions, as counterparties default on
their obligations in response to the shock.
Is there any unified approach to accurately and consistently estimate the magnitude of these
potential losses even after the positions are isolated? According to Kupiec (2001), the answer is
no. In many situations, the use of formal risk management models may add little in the way of
measurement rigor to the stress test process. For example, the construction of a reasonably
accurate estimate of the potential importance of an overall economic downturn and an increase in
problem bank loans need not require the use of some complicated formal credit risk measurement
model. Rather, historically informed judgmental estimates of the increase in NPLs and their
corresponding provisions may, in many cases, give a more accurate picture of potential exposures.
Depending on the interpretation attached to the stress test exposure estimate, it may be more
important to identify merely that the losses are likely to be significant rather than to attempt to
identify the “exact” magnitude of the losses.
Once the individual positions and portfolios that are likely to be the source of stress test losses are
identified, even after recognizing the underlying imprecision involved, the stress test must have a
way of revaluing these positions to reflect the effects of the stress scenario.
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4.5 Interpreting and Using Results
Stress test estimates, no matter how technical the model used to arrive at an estimate, are at best
only first order approximations to the true potential loss exposure. Stress testing is only a starting
point for analyzing the vulnerability of a financial system. Stress tests provide information
complementing the insights gathered using other analytical tools, in particular assessment of the
legal, institutional, regulatory, and supervisory framework; analysis of the financial system
structure and key vulnerabilities; and empirical analysis of financial soundness indicators.
When interpreting stress tests, one needs to bear in mind their limits and the assumptions on
which they are built. Typical stress tests view banks as static portfolios rather than actively
behaving units. A thorough examination of vulnerability, however, must take into account the fact
that banks adapt dynamically to shocks in the environment. Depending on the kinds of incentives
that banks face, these adaptations may exaggerate or mute the vulnerabilities created by the initial
shock. To understand the structure of incentives that banks may face in particular circumstances,
it is necessary to look at the institutional environment, such as the corporate governance
arrangements in banks; the legal, accounting, tax, and regulatory conditions; and how claim
holders on banks may react in the bond and equity markets to actions that banks take.
Stress tests should be interpreted as indicators of exposures rather than as forecasts of bank
failures. Exposures could appear large relative to an institution’s regulatory capital, and yet the
institution may well be able to survive the shock. One important reason is that a stress test
considers only a part of a bank’s income-generating operations. The bank may have significant
positions in assets that are unaffected in performance or value under the specific stress scenarios
analyzed. In particular, given their focus on financial asset and derivative value changes, stress
testing calculations tend to ignore the importance of fee income and other bank income sources
that are not formally “capitalized” on a bank’s balance sheet or recognized in off-balance sheet
position reports. The income from these operations might offset the losses that would arise in the
stress scenario envisioned.
Another caveat against interpreting stress tests simply as predictors of default is their mark-to-
market nature. Banks can often remain open and avoid default as long as regulators allow them to
continue operating, even if they are insolvent on a mark-to-market basis. Regulatory capital
requirements rely on book values and banks may suffer substantial mark-to-market losses on their
banking book assets without recording any adverse effect on their regulatory capital position.
Large mark-to-market losses on banking book assets are not reflected in regulatory capital
calculations, and not only do most rated credits that are downgraded continue to pay interest and
remain performing assets, but also many of them recover value as transitory market stresses
subside. Therefore, while mark-to-market loss estimates are informative as to an institution’s
financial risk exposures, they are not nearly as informative about the ability of a bank to sustain
losses and remain a going concern.14   Martin Čihák
5. Specific Methodological Issues
We will now turn to specific methodological issues relating to the individual risk factors, namely
exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, credit risk, equity price and real estate price risk, and
liquidity risk. We will then discuss the modeling of interbank contagion of these shocks. With the
significant exception of interbank contagion risk, a good introduction to modeling these risk
factors is provided in Blaschke et al. (2001), and it is assumed in the following text that the reader
is familiar with this basic paper.
5.1 Exchange Rate Risk: “Stress Testing 101”
Exchange rate risk is the risk that exchange rate changes affect the local currency value of
institutions’ (and the sector’s) assets and liabilities as well as off-balance sheet items. Exchange
rate risk can arise from positions in foreign currency as well as those in local currency that are
indexed to foreign exchange rates. Furthermore, exchange rate risk can be direct when financial
institutions have positions in foreign currency, or indirect when the foreign exchange positions
taken by the financial institutions’ borrowers may affect their creditworthiness.
The direct exchange rate risk can be assessed using the net open position in foreign exchange,
which is one of the core FSIs (Table 1). The direct exchange rate risk is perhaps the simplest of
the individual stress tests. To illustrate this stress test, let F denote the net open position in foreign
exchange, C the capital, ARW the risk-weighted assets (all in domestic currency units), and e the
exchange rate in units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency. A depreciation (decline)
in the exchange rate leads to a proportional decline in the domestic currency value of the foreign
exchange exposure, i.e. ∆e/e=∆F/F (for F≠0). Let us assume, for simplicity, that this translates
directly into a decline in capital, i.e. ∆C/∆F=1.
8 The impact of the exchange rate shock on the
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where we have used the fact that ∆C/∆e=∆F/∆e=F/e. The symbol “≅” means that the equation is
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The term ∆ARW /∆C can have values from 0 to 1, reflecting the degree of co-movement of capital
and the risk weighted assets.
9 In the special case of ∆ARW /∆C=0, i.e. if the risk-weighted assets do
not change, the change in the capital adequacy ratio equals simply the exchange rate shock times
the exposure, measured as a product of the two core FSIs (F/C and C/ARW). This is sometimes
used as a short-hand calculation of the direct exchange rate stress test. It should be noted that (2)
                                                          
8 More realistically, we could deduct the impact first from profits, and then from capital—see Čihák (2004) for a
discussion of the treatment of profits in stress tests.
9 Empirically, ∆ARW/∆C could be estimated by a regression.Stress Testing: A Review of key Concepts   15
holds only as a linear approximation, which works well if foreign exchange portfolios are
essentially linear. However, if banks have large positions in foreign exchange options, the
relationship between the exchange rate change and the impact on capital can become highly non-
linear. In such cases, stress tests based on detailed decomposition of banks’ open positions are a
superior analytical tool.
10
It is important to incorporate indirect foreign exchange risk into the stability assessment. The
indirect risk is often more significant than the direct one, given that the direct exposure is
relatively easy to measure and therefore to manage and regulate, while it is typically much more
difficult to monitor the foreign exchange vulnerabilities of banks’ counterparties. Especially in
countries with fixed or heavily managed exchange rates, firms and households can be lulled by the
perceived absence of foreign exchange risk and enter into large open positions in foreign
exchange. In some of these countries, regulators either have started to ask, or are contemplating
asking, banks to report!on their largest borrowers’ foreign exchange exposures. (The information
gathered in this way is undoubtedly useful; at the same time, it would not cover, for example,
foreign exchange exposures in the household sector, credit to which has been growing rapidly in
some countries.)
To illustrate the significance of the indirect risk, let us denote the corporate sector’s debt, equity,
and open foreign exchange position as Dc(e), Ec(e), and Fc(e) respectively. (For simplicity, we
will refer only to the corporate sector, even though the analysis would be essentially the same
even if we included the household sector.) Let us assume that, similarly to the case of the bank’s
net open position, a percentage change in the exchange rate will translate into the same percentage
change in the domestic currency value of the corporate sector’s net open position, which will in
turn lead to an equivalent change in the corporate sector’s equity, i.e. ∆Ec/∆e=∆Fc/∆e=F/e. The
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Thus, if the corporate sector is short in foreign exchange, a depreciation (decline) in the exchange
rate would lead to an increase in its leverage. Corporate leverage is typically positively correlated
with the share of banks’ NPLs in total loans (denoted as NPL/TL), i.e.
∆(NPL/TL)/∆(Dc/Ec)=a>0.
11 The impact of a change in the exchange rate on the NPL/TL ratio can
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In the special case when ∆Dc/∆Ec=0, the change in the NPL/TL ratio would equal the exchange
rate change times the respective FSI (the net open position), times the parameter a, which can be
                                                          
10 As a general point, stress tests need to include not only balance sheet positions, but also off-balance sheet
items.
11 For a panel of 47 countries, a 10 percentage point rise in corporate leverage was associated with a 1.1
percentage point rise in NPL/TL after a one year lag (see IMF, 2003).16   Martin Čihák
estimated empirically. To find the impact on capital adequacy, we can assume that the credit
shock has the form of a transition of performing loans into the nonperforming category. By
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where provisions are assumed to be a fixed percentage (π) of NPLs, and are deducted directly
from capital.
The incorporation of the indirect effect makes the analysis more complex and dependent on
additional assumptions or regression analysis. While the presentation of the direct effect in (2) and
the indirect effect in (5) may appear similar (in both cases, the change in the capital adequacy is
expressed as the shock times the net open position), the calculation of the indirect effect is
generally much more complex, given that it needs to include the impacts on stocks as well as on
flows. It must reflect the impact of exchange rate changes on the net present value of the corporate
sector, which means taking into account changes in the net present value of future earnings. For
example, in export-oriented companies, a depreciation can be expected to increase their future
earnings. In terms of the net present value, the effect would be essentially equivalent to the impact
of a long position in foreign currency. However, it may be more practical to calculate the impact
on flows, by estimating the elasticity of earnings to interest and principal expenses (an encouraged
FSI) with respect to the exchange rate, and then to estimate the relationship between this FSI and
the NPL/TL ratio. Alternatively, one can look at an indicator measuring the corporate sector’s
flow exposure, e.g. the ratio of earnings in foreign exchange to interest and principal expenses in
foreign exchange.
Exchange rate risk was analyzed in almost all FSAP missions. Half of them calculated the impact
on the net open foreign exchange position for individual institutions or for groups of banks, which
in turn was calibrated in terms of impact on capital. Regressions and Monte Carlo simulations to
determine the effect of exchange rate changes on credit quality (NPLs) were applied in about 40
percent of the FSAP missions (IMF and the World Bank, 2003).
5.2 Interest Rate Risk
Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank’s financial condition to adverse movements in interest
rates. Interest rate changes affect interest income and interest expenses as well as the balance
sheet through changes in market prices of financial instruments. Sources of interest rate risk are
discussed in Basel Committee (2001).
The impact of changes in the interest rate on net interest income is typically measured using the
“repricing gap” model. The model allocates interest-bearing assets and liabilities into buckets
according to their time to repricing, and the gap between assets and liabilities in each bucket is
used to estimate the net interest income exposure to interest rate changes (see Blaschke, 2001, for
practical examples). The position in interest-based financial derivatives can be incorporated into
this analysis by recalculating the expected future receipts and payments as interest rates change.Stress Testing: A Review of key Concepts   17
There are two commonly used approaches to measuring the effect of interest rate changes on
market prices of financial instruments: the duration model and the “gap” model. Duration, defined
as the weighted average term to maturity of assets/liabilities, is a direct measure of the interest
rate elasticity of an asset or liability.
12 The higher the duration, the more sensitive the price of an
asset or liability to changes in interest rates,
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where A(rA) and L(rL) are the market values of assets and liabilities of a banking system, and rA
and rL are annual interest rates on assets and liabilities (see, e.g., Bierwag, 1987). This feature of
duration can be used to summarize the impact of changes in interest rates on banks’ capital. In
particular, we can define capital as A(rA)–L(rL), and express it as a ratio to risk weighted assets.
13
Differentiating capital with respect to the interest rate on assets, and substituting from (6), the
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where the approximation on the second line assumed that the risk-weighted assets move


















The formulas (6) and (7) hold exactly for small changes in interest rates. For large changes in
interest rates, they are only linear approximations. For large changes in interest rates (which are
typically assumed in stress tests), it is necessary to take into account nonlinearity, since duration
can change with large changes in interest rates. Given that the price-yield relationship is convex
rather than linear, as assumed by the basic duration model, duration typically overpredicts the fall
in prices for large interest rate increases and underpredicts the increases in prices for large interest
rate declines. A new parameter (named CX for “convexity”) can be specified and estimated which
increases the precision of the estimates of the changes in the value of assets and liabilities:
14
                                                          
12 For the formula defining duration and practical examples of its calculation, see IMF (2003a).
13 The impacts can also be expressed in terms of banks’ profitability, which may be useful when branches of
foreign banks, which typically do not have own capital, play an important role. Bierwag (1987) derives the
impact on profits in the case of a single bank.
14 For more details, see, e.g., Saunders (2000).18   Martin Čihák
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An alternative approach to assessing the price revaluation effect of an interest rate shock is to use
“gap” analysis. Under this approach, expected payments on assets and liabilities are sorted into
time “buckets” according to the time to repricing for floating-rate instruments, and the time until
payments are due on fixed-rate instruments. The net present value of assets and liabilities can be
derived by discounting the net cash flows in each time bucket, and the effect of an interest rate
shock estimated by rediscounting the net cash flows using the changed interest rates. IMF (2003a)
provides a template for conducting such a gap analysis.
Interest rate risk was analyzed in the majority of the FSAP missions. Reflecting data constraints,
most FSAPs used maturity buckets and gap analysis. Some used more advanced techniques based
on duration or value at risk (VaR). About 25 percent of FSAP missions did not obtain data on
maturity buckets or duration and used income statement data instead to calculate simple earnings
at risk (IMF and the World Bank, 2003).
5.3 Credit Risk
Credit risk can be defined as the loss associated with unexpected changes in credit quality.
Despite many innovations in banking, credit risk is typically the most significant source of risk.
The largest source of credit risk is loans; however, it also takes the form of positions in corporate
bonds or transactions on over-the-counter markets, which involve the risk of a default of the
counterparty.
Measuring credit risk involves estimation of a number of different parameters: the likelihood of
default on each instrument both on average and under extreme conditions; the extent of the losses
in the event of default (or loss given default), which may involve estimating the value of
collateral; and the likelihood that other counterparties will default at the same time.
There are two general approaches to system-wide stress tests for credit risk. First, there are
approaches based on loan performance data. These can be either purely mechanical (assuming
certain shocks to performance of loans) or based on a regression analysis between loan
performance and macroeconomic variables. Second, there are approaches based on data on
borrowers (financial leverage, interest coverage).
More than half of the FSAP missions used NPL-based approaches to modeling credit risk. About
60 percent of the missions used ad-hoc NPL migration. Only about 30 percent of the missions
found it useful to apply regression analyses to examine the impact of future potential
macroeconomic shocks on the behavior of non-performing loans (IMF and the World Bank,
2003).
Approaches based on loan performance data
The advantage of this approach is that loan performance data are relatively easily available to
supervisors. Also, they are available for all sectors, including the household sector (for which it is
difficult or impossible to obtain reliable balance sheet or income statement information). The key
disadvantage of this approach is that NPLs are lagging indicators of asset quality.Stress Testing: A Review of key Concepts   19
The first subgroup of approaches in this group are those based on asset reclassification. Under this
approach, loans (and other assets) are moved one or more classification categories down. The
potential effect of the loan reclassification on the capital ratio is calculated after deducting the
additional provisions from both the reported capital data and the reported asset data.
There are various types of asset reclassification. It can be purely mechanical (e.g. a certain
percentage of loans in each category is moved down by a category) or it can be based on
experience with past crisis episodes (e.g. the percentage of loans reclassified is the same as the
percentage of loans migrating down during the last banking sector crisis). Alternatively, if
sufficiently detailed information is available, it can be based on “peer reviews” whereby loans to
the same borrower from different institutions are reclassified according to the lowest grade
assigned by an institution (this could be a very laborious approach, though). Another approach is
based on “supervisory reviews”: for example, if recent on-site examinations in some banks have
uncovered significant discrepancies between the reported and “true” classification of loans, a
stress test could assess what would happen if similar discrepancies were found in other banks.
The second subgroup of approaches in this group are those based on a regression or a VAR model
including NPLs and a number of macroeconomic factors, such as real interest rates, GDP growth,
and terms of trade changes.
15 The regressions can be run at sectoral level (if there are data on
NPLs by economic sectors) or even on the individual bank level to capture the banks’ different
sensitivities to macroeconomic developments (this approach can, however, be too resource
intensive; it is therefore more common to use regressions for aggregated data). The parameters
estimated in the regression of aggregate NPLs and other variables can be fed into the bank-by-
bank calculations based on the individual banks’ positions. This is sometimes referred to as
combining a “top-down approach” (i.e. one starting from aggregate relationships) with a “bottom-
up approach” (i.e. one starting from individual bank data and proceeding to an aggregation).
Problems with the regression approach include the lack of long and consistent time series data on
NPLs. Even where the data are available for a sufficiently long time period, they may exhibit
structural breaks due to financial and economic reforms which may have changed the behavioral
patterns of lenders and borrowers. Moreover, considerable caution is needed when drawing
conclusions from models that may be subject to several sources of error. They should be
thoroughly cross-checked where possible with conclusions derived from other approaches or
sources of information, such as the FSIs for the nonfinancial corporate sector.
Approaches based on data on borrowers
Approaches based on data on borrowers have the potential advantage that they can provide more
“substance” to the credit risk stress test by explicitly modeling linkages between the health of the
real sector and the financial sector. Another advantage of borrowers data is that they can help to
indicate problems in the loan portfolio earlier than the loan classification, which is by definition a
lagging indicator. A potential disadvantage of this approach is that data on borrowers (in
particular households and small and medium-sized enterprises) are often difficult to obtain and are
typically available only with long lags.
                                                          
15 See Blaschke et al. (2001) for an illustration.20   Martin Čihák
Cross-country calculations do indeed suggest that leverage is a good early warning indicator for
higher NPLs. IMF (2003b) includes an estimate of a model of the following type:
where npls is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, lev is the leverage ratio, rcc is the
real cost of capital, reer is the real effective exchange rate,  y ˆ is the growth rate of real GDP,  p ˆ is
the inflation rate, m ˆ is the growth rate of M1, d ˆ  is the growth rate of domestic credit, and roe is
corporate sector return on equity. IMF (2003b) includes a detailed economic justification of these
three equations and estimates, using the panel data approach, that, on average, (i) a 10 percentage
point increase in corporate leverage is associated with a 1.8 percentage point rise in NPLs relative
to total loans after one year; and (ii) a 1 percentage point rise in GDP growth results, on average,
in a 2.6 percentage point decline in the NPLs to loans ratio, reflecting the fact that during periods
of rapid growth fewer corporations are likely to experience problems repaying loans, or to default.
There is a wide range of possible approaches to modeling credit risk, depending on the availability
of data. A relatively elaborate approach used in some countries is to estimate a logit model
predicting individual bankruptcy probabilities as a function of age, size, industry characteristics,
and corporate soundness indicators (leverage, earnings, liquidity, financial strength). The model
would include interest and exchange rates on the right hand side (to capture the indirect risk).
Individual banks would be linked to the exercise through their exposures to the various groups of
companies. This could then be used to predict banks’ potential losses, taking into account
collateral as well. Eklund et al. (2001) is an example of a model of this type, used by the Bank of
Norway.
A simpler approach would be based on exposure variables. The basic idea of this approach is that
if an exposure variable exceeds an estimated (or assumed) threshold, the default rate becomes
higher. Similarly to the previous approach, this would be translated to banks’ losses, taking into
account collateral held by banks. An example of an exposure variable is the net open position in
foreign exchange and the ratio of foreign exchange income to foreign exchange costs (for indirect
foreign exchange risk). To measure indirect interest risk, the exposure variable to use would be
interest coverage.
5.4 Equity and Real Estate Price Risk
Equity price risk is modeled in a similar way to foreign exchange risk. The calculation is based on
the net open position in equities, which is defined in a similar fashion to the net open position in
foreign exchange.
16 Similarly to foreign exchange risk, it is necessary to include the off-balance
sheet position.
Banks’ exposure to real estate price risk consists of (i) the direct exposure (investment in real
estate); (ii) credit exposures (e.g. lending to real estate developers); and (iii) risk resulting from
the degree of real estate collateralization. The risk arising from real estate collateral should be
                                                          
16 See the Financial Soundness Indicators Compilation Guide, IMF (2003a).
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seen in relation to the credit risk; it increases with the loan-to-value ratio (i.e. the ratio of the
outstanding loan to the value of the collateral) and with the default probability.
In the case of the direct exposure to real estate price risk, the difference between the mark-to-
market approach and book value approach, mentioned earlier (Section IV.E.), is particularly
important when interpreting stress test results. The impact on banks’ reported data resulting from
changes in real estate prices is going to be much smaller than suggested by a stress test when
banks (as is often the case) do not mark to market their real estate investments.
Equity or real estate price risk was examined in about half of the FSAP missions. In most cases,
equity price risk stress tests were included in general market risk, i.e. risk related to a major
change in the overall stock market, usually a market crash scenario (IMF and the World Bank,
2003).
5.5 Liquidity Risk and Other Risks
Liquidity risk is the risk that assets are not readily available to meet a demand for cash. Stress
testing the liquidity of the banking sector involves assessing the impact on the liquidity gap of a
shock such as large-scale deposit withdrawals, a large fall in the price of equities, or an exchange
rate crisis. Modeling liquidity risk is often considered to be much more difficult than modeling
interest rate or exchange rate risk. Many central banks therefore rely on the liquidity stress tests
conducted by the banks themselves. The results of these stress tests are reported off-site, which is
followed-up by integrity checks during on-site visits.
The most challenging step in designing a liquidity stress test is identifying which assets that are
normally considered liquid may become illiquid in periods of financial stress. IMF (2003a)
provides operational guidelines for defining liquid assets and liquid liabilities which could be used
as the starting point for conducting stress tests. Similarly to the other stress tests, off-balance sheet
positions (e.g. derivatives or loan commitments extended by banks) can have a significant impact
on liquidity and should not be neglected in the stress tests.
A straightforward approach to stress testing for liquidity risk is to shock the value of liquid
resources by a certain percentage or amount. The percentage or amount could be determined
based on past bank runs or on a rule of thumb, and it should generally be different for different
maturities. A rule of thumb used by some supervisors is that a bank should be able to survive at
least five days of a moderate liquidity run without outside support. The reason behind this choice
of threshold is that this would make it possible for the bank to survive till the weekend, when
banks are closed. This “cooling-off” period would enable the bank and supervisors to better assess
the situation and, where appropriate, take necessary actions.
A version of liquidity risk is concentration risk on banks’ liabilities. This is typically modeled as
the risk of sudden withdrawals by the banks’ largest depositors. Another version of liquidity risk
is the risk of bank-to-bank contagion of liquidity stress. An example of such contagion would be a
liquidity run on a bank perceived as “weak,” triggered by liquidity problems (either genuine ones,
or also caused by a liquidity run) in another bank. Subsection F below provides a discussion of
interbank contagion risk, focusing on contagion through uncollateralized interbank exposures. The
modeling of contagion through reputational effects would be conceptually the same, but22   Martin Čihák
practically more difficult, since there are no good data on bank-by-bank exposures in terms of
reputational effects. Čihák (2004) includes a discussion of possible ways to model such
reputational effects.
Other shocks included in some of the FSAP missions are likely to be less relevant to stress tests
for the Czech banking system. These shocks generally reflected the specific circumstances of a
given country. For instance, several FSAP missions included stress tests for commodity price risk,
notably in developing countries, where trade in commodities is important (IMF and the World
Bank, 2003).
5.6 Interbank Contagion Stress Test
Interbank stress testing complements the standard set of stress tests by measuring the risk that the
failure of a bank or a group of banks will trigger the failure of other banks within the system.
There are a number of interbank contagion channels. The most direct one is contagion through
uncollateralized interbank lending, which was an important transmission channel during the Asian
crisis. Other plausible channels of contagion include reputational effects, whereby a perceived
stability problem in a bank could make it difficult for other banks in the system to borrow
liquidity in international markets. Such a lack of confidence would either entirely prevent the
banks from accessing international markets for liquidity or raise the funding costs substantially,
exacerbating any liquidity problem the bank faces. The reputational effect of a failure of a bank
can also lead to liquidity runs on other banks that are perceived as weak. Conceptually, modeling
reputational effects would be similar to modeling contagion through lending exposures.
Empirically, however, it is much more difficult to define the “exposures” for reputational risk.
Čihák (2004) offers some discussion of proxy variables to characterize such contagion.
We will now focus on the risk of contagion through banks’ uncollateralized interbank loans.
There are two basic types of interbank stress tests: (i) the pure interbank stress test, where the
shock is the failure of one bank, triggered for example by fraud, and where the impact on other
banks in the system is through the interbank exposures; (ii) the integrated interbank stress test,
where the banking system is first subjected to macro shocks or scenarios and if these shocks or
scenarios trigger a failure of a bank or a group of banks, the interbank stress test is run to assess
the impact of additional failures through interbank exposures, as in the pure interbank stress test.
The key element of interbank contagion stress test calculations is a matrix of bilateral interbank
exposures (Table 2). The cells of the matrix contain the gross bilateral interbank exposures
between banks, defined as all uncollateralized lending from one bank to another, covering all on-
and off-balance sheet exposures. Each row in the matrix corresponds to a bank and the cells in the
row give its gross interbank exposure with respect to every other bank in the interbank market.
The “pure” interbank contagion stress test aims to answer the question of whether the failure of
any bank (or group of banks) would bring down other banks in the system. It can also be used to
show to what extent other banks are weakened (even if no bank fails) because of the potential for
this to trigger a liquidity crisis (as banks have imperfect information about the solvency of their
counterparties). This stress test could be useful in identifying which banks are a potential source
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Table 2: Matrix of Bank-to-Bank Exposures
  Bank 1 Bank 2 ·   ·   · Bank n
Bank 1 -- -- Exposure of
bank 1 to
bank 2
·   ·   · Exposure of
bank 1 to
bank n
Bank 2 Exposure of
bank 2 to
bank 1
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The pure contagion test assumes that there is a failure in a bank (say, Bank 1). The failure can
occur for any reason, for instance due to a fraud. The first round of the contagion calculation
would than calculate the direct impact of Bank 1’s failure on each of the other banks, assuming
Bank 1 would not repay its uncollateralized interbank exposures (or a portion of the exposures). If
some banks fail as a result of Bank 1’s failure, the second round of the calculation would calculate
the impact on each of the remaining banks of these newly failed banks not repaying their
uncollateralized interbank exposures. The process can be repeated in a third run if there are new
failures after the second run, and so on.
Two indicators of systemic risk can be calculated from the output of the pure interbank stress test:
(i) a frequency of bank failure indicator, which is the ratio of the cumulative number of failures to
the number of banks in the system; (ii) statistical measures of the impact on bank system capital
(e.g. mean, distribution, and quartiles). Specifically, one can define a “systemic risk index”, the
average reduction in the capital ratios of banks in the system triggered by the failure of the
systemically most important bank (or banks). Such a measure could be computed for all banks in
the system and used to rank them by their systemic importance.
The “macro” contagion test differs from the pure contagion test in that it focuses on interbank
contagion triggered by a macroeconomic stress (Figure 3). It first exposes the banking system to a
stressful macroeconomic scenario. If the scenario triggers failures of some banks, the interbank
contagion is then run as in the pure contagion test. The key difference is that the contagion takes
place in a system that has already been weakened by the macroeconomic scenario or shock, so it
is more likely that it will spread in further bank failures. If the scenario does not trigger any bank
failures, one possible conclusion is that there is no interbank contagion for this particular scenario
(there might still be liquidity problems, given that banks have imperfect information about their
counterparties). Alternatively, one could ask what is the largest shock that does not trigger a
“chain reaction” in the system. To answer this question, one needs to “gross up” the
macroeconomic shocks until the weakest institution (or group of weakest institutions) fails, and
calculate the interbank contagion effects as in the pure contagion test.24   Martin Čihák
Similarly to the pure interbank contagion stress test, quantitative measures of systemic risk can be
produced. Exactly the same frequency of bank failures statistics as described above can be used.
However, the index of systemic risk will be different and needs to be decomposed into two
components: (i) the average reduction in capital ratios due to the grossed-up shock; and (ii) the
further reduction in the average of these ratios triggered by the failure of the bank due to the
shock, which causes it to default on its loans. This latter index is identical to the one in the pure
stress test.
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Appendix II: Framework for Financial Stability Analysis
The figure below provides more details on the framework for financial stability analysis and
supplements Figure 1 in the main text.
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